by
Andreas Dimitropoulos
Emeritus
Professor,
Law School, University of Athens
1. Studying the Platonic theory of ideas, I found myself in the middle of
two conflicting ascertainments. From a philosophical point of view, agreeing
with Aristotle - and many others - I could not accept the existence of a second
essentially imaginary world of Ideas simultaneous and parallel to the real
world. From a legal point of view, however, I could not help but admit that the
Platonic theory of Ideas, as a theory of a "world-model", is of
particular interest to legal thought. Regardless of its general philosophical
value and impact, its importance for legal science must be recognized. The
theory of ideas, transferred and adapted to the legal field, as a theory of
legal ideas, really has a lot to offer in legal thought. Making it clear that
the real world is reflected in the legal space without its imperfections,
reformed and embellished, emerges as a powerful tool of legal elaboration. It
provides a clear picture of the overall legal structure of its operation, the
size and boundaries of the legal space, the relationships and the perpetual
interaction of legal regulation and reality. It lays the foundations for a
deeper understanding of legal concepts and their relationship to real ideas and
the real world.
The acceptance of the theory of Ideas as a tool of legal
thought is anything but a triumph of idealism in the legal field. There is
indeed a close relationship between the theory of ideas and legal science.
After all, legal thought basically revolves around a "top idea", the
idea of justice. It is indeed this innate affinity of Platonism and legal
thought that often leads some jurists to an unrealistic legal idealism. Indeed,
no one is more prone to idealism than the jurist. The correct approach to
Platonism and legal thought is anything but an idealistic explanation of the
origin, existence and function of law, the construction or support of an
idealistic legal conception. It means much more the correct use of the theory
of ideas for the benefit of legal science, which based on a non-idealistic
theory of legal concepts, can actually lead to a realistic legal theory.
2. The paternity of the conception of the existence of a separate ethical
world - model, "eternal and unchangeable", of the world of ideas,
belongs to the founder of idealism, Aristocles, the philosopher with the broad
front, Plato. Plato spoke in the State about the place where there are ideas, the
meanings and the place where there are the things. The philosopher recognizes
two different worlds, the sensible which is variable and is in constant flow
according to Heraclitus and the imaginary world, which is unchangeable, that
is, the celestial world in which ideas are located. There is therefore a clear
hierarchy between the two worlds. The world of ideas precedes and the real
follows.
According to Platonic theory, ideas are archetypal
eternals and unchanging models of tangible material things, transcendental
entities, which are not perceived by the senses but only by logic. Perceptible
objects are the idols of Ideas. According to Plato, ideas do not exist in the
terrestrial world, but in a heavenly world of Ideas. Platonic ideas are
therefore not "simple concepts" but existing entities. According to
Platonic theory, ideas are self-existent entities, independent of reality. The
argument that tries to convince about the self-existence of ideas has the
peculiarity that it is based on the futility of the opposite version. According
to Platonic reasoning, research to identify and define any general pattern
makes absolutely no sense if it does not exist. For example, what is the
meaning of the definition of justice and what is the benefit of trying to determine
if it is only imaginary? According to Plato, it must be accepted that concepts
such as justice, virtue, beauty do not exist only in our minds, they are not
just concepts. Much more they are entities, which are a special
"species" {orαidea) of these and other concepts.
Platonic ideas are in fact general concepts as
Aristotle assures us. Their "ontological upgrade" from Platonic
theory is due to their placement in the "heavenly world of ideas" and
their rendering of "life", that is, their reduction to existing
entities that are eternal and unchanging. Aristotle, as a student of Plato, was taught the theory of ideas, however,
not only does he not support it, but he proceeds to a strict critique of this
Platonic theory, mainly in his work "After the Natural" (book A,
chapter 9). Aristotle points out that Ideas do not cause any movement or change
in sentient beings, they have nothing to do with the physical world and its
changes. The real cause that makes nature work has absolutely nothing to do
with Ideas. Therefore the Platonic Ideas are not useful for explaining the
world and they were given too much importance without being worth it.
Aristotle's main objection, then, is that Ideas are not autonomous beings and
cannot explain the physical world and its changes. If we accept, as Plato
argues, that every existing sensible being corresponds to a separate Idea,
then, as Aristotle argues, we "double" the beings of the sensible
world without it being of any use.
But also none of Plato's successors defended the
theory of Ideas as presented in the Platonic dialogues and each gave different
interpretations. Following the critique of the
theory of ideas by Aristotle, the thought of Epicurus and many others but also
the empirical rules, a world of ideas can not be accepted in parallel with the
existing world. The Platonic world is a fantasy world, a world that ultimately
does not exist.
3. The basic differentiation from the theory of Ideas
goes back to the acceptance of the essential sources of law. A prudent
idealistic conception should accept that law is a product of the idea of
justice. But law is not a product of the idea but of the living reality.
Nature and power are the creators, the natural sources of law and the legal
world.
Legal world is the world of legal ideas / concepts,
the world of legal rules and legal entities. The idea of the legal world as a
world of legal ideas arose from the comparison and finding of "natural
kinship", which connects it with the Platonic world of ideas. In other
words, it is the "legal world" as a world of legal ideas, a product
of philosophical and legal cooperation, from which the latter always benefits
mainly from the former. Because legal thought without a philosophical
foundation is poor and meteoric. The legal space is indeed an "other area",
in which the real world is ethically reflected. The legal world is closely
related to the real but different from it and accompanies almost every aspect
of our lives. The legislator, bound by the general regulatory principles
inherent in the nature of the matter, sets rules of law, organizes and
regulates the overall social coexistence. In this way he builds a legal world
parallel to the real one. The legislator with the establishment of
institutions, the recognition of legal relations, the securing of rights and
the imposition of obligations, the direct or indirect definition of legal
concepts that do not exist in reality or even concepts different from those
corresponding to their real idols, with the "creation" legal
formations and creatures of law, constructs an imaginary world of legal ideas /
concepts. The legislator does indeed have life-giving power in the formations
of the legal world. It is not surprising that all of the above cannot be fully
expressed without the appropriate verbal investment. The legal field is an area
in which - as is the case in other sciences or other special areas - a
"special language" is spoken, where many "common words"
take on a very different content, an area where legal experts are created. needs
of technical terms (terminus technicus) of special legal terminology with a
specified specific semantic load capable of the legal translation of the real
world
4. The natural affinity of the Platonic and
legal worlds highlights the usefulness of the theory of ideas for legal
science, which proves useful for the foundation, organization and orientation
of legal thought. From the first contact with the Platonic theory of ideas, the
jurist realizes the close relationship that exists between the world of ideas
and the legal world. Despite their great differences, there are common features
between them. The characteristics of the world of ideas immediately seem very
familiar to the legal. But also the brief reference to the legal world and its
characteristics, refers to the Platonic world of ideas. Many of the
characteristics of the world of ideas match the particularities of legal
science, serve and aid legal thought.
- Like the Platonic, the legal world refers to the
real world without which they have no meaning. Each of them necessarily
"coexists" in parallel with the real. Legal and real world are two
"parallel worlds".
- The legal world, like the Platonic world, is an
imaginary world, conceivable. Both the legal and the Platonic are both worlds
of ideas, imaginary worlds. But at the same time they are ideal worlds, model
worlds.
- Both consist of ideas, of general concepts.
- The legal world is the world of perfection, the
world of standards, just like the Platonic world of ideas.
5. The conclusion that the world of ideas is, after all, an imaginary
world, in no way precludes the establishment of the existence of the legal
world, the main creator of which is the legislator. The first big difference
between the Platonic and the legal world concerns their existence. The first
does not exist, while the second is real, it is present here and indisputable.
The world of ideas may not exist, as Plato imagined, but there is the legal
order and the imaginary legal world. The existence of the legal world is
self-evident and indisputable. Thus the legal world differs and has an
advantage over the Platonic world of ideas. There is a capital difference
between them.
The legal world is conceivable but not imaginary. There is no doubt that it exists in parallel with the real world in which
we live. The legal world exists not in some imaginary or any other space, but
here in the pre-legal world it exists, for example, through the visible action
of legal formations. agmatic space parallel to and simultaneously towards it.
The existence of the legal world distinct and different from the real world is
indisputable. This existence is largely synonymous with legal force. Rules of
law acquire legal breath through force and many formations of legal life with
their recognition by law. In the legal world, legal life unfolds simultaneously
and in parallel with real life, but there is also legal death. The legal world
exists because and in the way that there is law. His condition, his presence
becomes strongly visible mainly in cases of delinquency. Because it exists
precisely if you violate it you will be punished. The legal world, although
imaginary, exists, it is not "heavenly" but it is here parallel to
the real, it is not independent of it, it is inextricably linked to it.
The world of law is the world of due diligence and the
real world is. Real-world persons and things have their respective legal idols.
Almost everything that exists is "reflected" in the legal sphere. The
legal world is the regulatory functional set, which as such does not fall into
our senses but is perceived by the mind. It is therefore an imaginary world.
The legal world consisting of ideas, standards, general and abstract concepts
is not perceived by the senses and is not in the real but in the imaginary
spiritual world.
Although as an abstract concept the whole legal world
is not perceived through the senses, the effects of non-compliance with its
requirements are visible in everyday reality. While he himself as a whole
general and abstract belongs to the spiritual realm, manifestations from
specific cases of its application are visible in the real realm.
Jurisprudence is faced with two worlds, the real and
the legal, law and things, reality. Law and reality are the two poles to which
legal thought must simultaneously turn. It thus seems at first sight to be
based on a dualistic basis, such as that of Platonic dualism. But the
confrontation of the two worlds of the legal and the real must not lead to
either legal dualism or legal idealism. The parallel management of law and reality
in legal processing is certainly not without difficulties. The lawyer can very
easily turn in one direction or the other. The jurist should not be led to
dualism but to the monistic synthesis of a real and legal element. Not to look
exclusively at the legal world and the declared content of the rule of law,
thus joining the positivist school and following a positivist or even
idealistic interpretation, ignoring reality. It is legal monism that helps to
properly deal with the relationship between law and reality. According to a
monotheistic legal approach, law and reality, on the one hand, are distinct on
the other hand and are inseparable as they are integral parts of a single
whole. Just like one thing and its shadow. The legal world is completely dependent
on the real world. These two worlds are not independent of each other, but are
integral parts of a larger unity. Properly, justice and reality are
inextricably linked. They are two subsets of a larger set. The legal world is
not understood without a view of the real world. It is not exclusively a brain
creation but was created in view of a specific reality.
6. Based on the fundamental position of Socratic thought on the definitions
of concepts, Plato went much further by constructing the theory of ideas.
Belief in Ideas that exist in a separate world constitutes what is known as the
"Platonic Theory of Ideas".
Just as the world of ideas is made up of ideas, so the
world of legal ideas is made up of legal ideas, concepts. In other words, the
legal space is the space in which legal entities, legal ideas, concepts exist
and operate. In both cases - the Platonic and the legal world - these are
basically general concepts. Concept refers
to reality, to the things around us, and legal concepts to things in the legal
world. Legal concepts are the "component" of the
legal world.
(a) The term "concept" expresses a minimal
semantic unit, a unit of knowledge.
(b) The concept itself does not really exist. It is an inner semantic
unit - image, which is (inside) our mind, en-on (en-meaning). The understanding
of people is that with words they perceive exactly or approximately the same
images, which they see with the eyes of the mind.
(c) The breadth of a concept is the number of similar things it contains.
(d) The depth of a concept is its essential features, which are common to all the
similar things to which it refers.
According to Th. North (Logical) meaning is a
universal representation, which includes the main features of one or more
objects, with which their essence is expressed. In terms of width and depth, a concept is the set of
main features of a set of similar objects, specific (eg man, building,
triangle, tree) or abstract (eg time, justice, bravery), as well as the
permanent and definite image (representation). , formed in our minds by them.
The great question of the more specific definition,
that is, the definition of concepts, was first posed by Socrates and belongs
together with dialectics to his valuable contributions to human thought and philosophy.
Socrates argued - according to Plato, Aristotle and Xenophon - that there is no
point in discussing moral issues, such as how to act justly, or aesthetic
issues, e.g. if a thing is beautiful or ugly, unless the meaning of the words
"justice" and "beauty" has been previously defined. Without
this (pre) definition we do not know exactly the subject of the discussion
because the interlocutors may have different representations and give different
conceptual content to the same words. The (pre) definition, that is, the
definition of concepts, provides the criteria by which it is possible to
evaluate acts and objects. This claim seems partly true. Indeed, the truth of
the Socratic assertion concerns only the special scientific fields, but not the
general, common use of words. Words in the context of specific sciences or in
other specific areas acquire more specific content, acquire specialized
semantic charge, and often change into technical legal terms. For example, the
word law, justice definitely need a definition in the context of legal science.
But the same is not true for the common use of words in everyday life. The
common or general use of words does not need any (predefined) definition.
Words, as verbal clothing of nouns, have a semantic core and a semantic
periphery. The "hard" semantic core of words remains essentially
unchanged and is perceived by the average, non-specialist person who feels and
understands the content of words without the need for any prior definition.
Otherwise it would be extremely difficult if not impossible to simply
communicate between people.
7. The Platonic ideas according to their inspirer
exist in a world separate in a world different from the one in which we live.
in the world of ideas. The result of the creation of the parallel to the real,
legal world is that the citizen of every state, of every organized society
lives simultaneously within these two parallel worlds, on the one hand in
reality and on the other hand within the framework of the overall legal regulation.
The coexistence of these two parallel worlds is of particular importance to
legal science. The idea of the right, of the perfect, of the model, governs
both the Platonic world of ideas and the legal world, is inherent in the nature
of both, establishing an inseparable bond between them, which automatically
refers to each other. The meaning of the model belongs to this very nature of
law, as right and the rule of law, which indicates the "straight"
that is not the wrong, the right and not the wrong. The conceivable
"infallible" "eternal" model of the legal world, the
"legal idea" indicates and illuminates the real world. The legal
world is, like the Platonic world of ideas, free from the imperfections of the
real world, a model to which the real world must adapt. It is an imaginary
world but also an ideal one. It is, in the judgment of the legislator,
"perfect world", exemplary, "model world". The legislator
acts like the painter, who paints the portrait of the real world, removing the
spots, the wrinkles, the unnecessary weight and any other imperfection that
aggravates or tarnishes his image. Ultimately the legislator designs an
exemplary copy of the real world. The individual regulatory interventions
added, constitute an exemplary set. An exemplary picture of reality. What is
commonly said, that law regulates social coexistence, means precisely that it
creates some models which together compose an exemplary world. For example, the
organizational part of constitutional law describes a model of the state, such
as the provisions on the social rule of law that regulate a specific model of
state organization and operation. At the same time, the set of provisions
referring to constitutional rights describes the model of a citizen. legislator
establishes the constitutional model of the free man. Law creates models for
the real world. The legislator with prohibitive and other provisions creates
standards of behavior, standardized forms of behavior. The legal world is an
exemplary world, a model, a beacon that illuminates the real world. These
standard images are Ideal, they do not exist in reality themselves, but in the
mind, in the mind, as concepts, they are understood, that is, they are
conceivable, abstract ideas that are not perceived through the senses but only
with logic, with the mind. .
